I. Introduction
Territorial change is often a painful process. It impacts not only upon the international community and the states concerned, both old and new, but also upon the individuals and groups that inhabit the areas involved. This is especially so where an existing independent state is dismantled in whole or in part How such interests may be acceptably accommodated within the framework of international law is a crucial question in an era of rapid and dramatic international political change. The major elements to be considered in situations of change of sovereignty include, apart from human rights generally, the rights of self-determination and of groups, and the law relating to territory. The latter would embrace the rules governing the acquisition of title and the principles of stability of boundaries and territorial integrity. In particular, the problem is raised of the legal basis of the transformation of internal or administrative borders into international boundaries upon independence in the light of territorial and human rights concerns.
In looking at these elements, the essential focus needs to be upon the instant in time, or the bridge of time, at which, or during which, a new political entity emerges upon the international scene. This is the vantage point from which one must survey the interplay of relevant principles as the international community seeks to come to terms with a new member in a way which is acceptable to it, to states generally, to the states especially involved and to the individuals, peoples and groups particularly concerned While considering the range of applicable principles, one must keep in mind that what is in question for present purposes is the basis of legitimation of the new entity in law and not in politics or morality, for these raise different issues.
A new state may seek the source of its legitimacy within the framework of international law either in the territorialist conception, whereby it claims that it is entitled to come to independence within a particular and accepted territorial framework, or as a consequence of the exercise of self-determination, with its focus upon the peo-In other words, the principle of self-determination of peoples was territorially defined. It is important to reiterate this point The territorial dimension of a state is guaranteed by international law and this, until relatively recently, included colonial possessions. The gradual evolution of the international law of self-determination resulted in a breaking of the link between overseas colony and metropolitan power in so far as the principle of territorial integrity was concerned. But this was accomplished in a way that preserved the now separate territorial integrity of the colonial unit Self-determination, therefore, ensured the distinct identity of the colony and its decolonization, but on the basis of accepting the existence of a discrete territorial unit in international law. It did not operate as a general rule as a means whereby each group within the territory had the right in international law to determine its own political future up to and including separate statehood. The crucial policy need to preserve as far as possible the stability of territorial relationships was evident and emphasized. As the Chamber of the International Court in the Burkina Faso/Mali case 14 noted, the essential requirement of stability of boundaries had induced newly independent states to consent to the respecting of colonial borders 'and to take account of it in the interpretation of the principle of self-determination of peoples'.
Inevitably, the question arose as to whether this principle applied outside of the colonial context The 1970 Declaration on Principles of International Law referred to self-determination as arising, in addition to the colonial context, in situations of
'subjection of peoples to alien subjugation, domination and exploitation', while Article 1(4) of Additional Protocol L 1977, to the Geneva Red Cross Conventions of 1949, refers to 'peoples fighting against colonial domination and alien occupation and against racist regimes in the exercise of their right to self-determination'. 13 Cassese concludes correctly that this phraseology has been interpreted cautiously in state practice to mean situations where one power dominates the people of a foreign territory by recourse to force, so that the right to external self-determination is consequently the counterpart of the prohibition on the use of force in international relations. 16 In this case, there are no territorial implications since the application of the right to self-determination in order to reverse the existing illegality takes place within the pre-existing territorial limits, examples being Afghanistan and Cambodia under foreign Soviet and Vietnamese occupations. The Israeli-occupied territories is a slightly different situation in that the sovereignty of the area was in dispute prior to the Israeli occupation. The final settlement between Israel and the Palestinians will no doubt resolve, on the basis of mutual consent, the issue as to borders, although the starting-point would inevitably be the area as occupied in 1967.
Whether self-determination applies in a far more general sense to states that have already attained independence, thus enabling any 'people' to secede if it so wishes, constitutes the real conundrum. Having acted as the legal tool for the dismantling of 14 ICJ Report* (1986) 354. at 566-7.
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See e.g. Cassese, tupra note 2, at 90 tt uq.
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Ibid, at 99. See e.g. the resolutions adopted by the UN with regard to Hungary, Tibet, the Israelioccupied territories, Afghanistan, Cambodia, East Timor and Kuwait, ibid, at 94-8.
colonial empires, could self-determination be the kver to dismember states? The answer to this lies in the essential meaning of self-determination and its relationship with the principle of territorial integrity. In practice, this relationship has been clearly marked ouL The very UN instruments that proclaimed the foundation of selfdetermination also clearly prohibited tbe partial or total disruption of the national unity and territorial integrity of existing independent states.
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Regional instruments also emphasized the importance of the territorial integrity of states in this context Principle VIE of the Helsinki Final Act, 1975, for instance, noted that, 'the participating states will respect the equal rights of peoples and their right to self-determination, acting at all times in conformity with the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations and with tbe relevant norms of international law, including those relating to territorial integrity of States'. 18 In addition, the Charter of Paris for a New Europe adopted by the Heads of State and Government of tbe Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe in 1990 declared that the participating states 'reaffirm tbe equal rights of peoples and their right to self-determination in conformity with the Charter of the United Nations and with the relevant norms of international law, including those relating to the territorial integrity of states'. 19 This approach, that self-determination must be seen as subject to the principle of die territorial integrity of independent states, is reaffirmed by other practice. In particular, tbe Arbitration Commission of tbe European Conference on Yugoslavia in an influential pronouncement declared that 'it is well established that, whatever the circumstances, the right to self-determination must not involve changes to existing frontiers at the time of independence (uti possidetis juris) 20 except where the states concerned agree otherwise'.
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One needs at this stage, however, to refer to the famous clause in tbe 1970 Declaration on Principles of International Law Concerning Friendly Relations, 22 which states that nothing in the section on self-determination shall be construed as authorizing or encouraging tbe dismembering or impairing of tbe territorial integrity of states conducting themselves in compliance with the principle of self-determination 'and thus possessed of a government representing the whole people belonging to the territory without distinction as to race, creed or colour'. 23 The implication here is that, by reversing the proposition, states that do not so conduct themselves are not . protected by the principle of territorial integrity. This, however, is hardly acceptable. Such a major change in legal principle cannot be introduced by way of an ambiguous subordinate clause, especially when the principle of territorial integrity has always been accepted and proclaimed as a core principle of international law, and is indeed placed before the qualifying clause in the provision in question. It seems that upon reflection the following points may legitimately be made. First, the inevitable and unavoidable starting point remains that of the primacy of the principle of territorial integrity. This continues to be a determining principle of overwhelming importance in international law. Secondly, the clause in question authoritatively reaffirms the actual content of self-determination, that is the non-discriminatory participation in government of the whole people, within the territory in question. Whether it can also be seen as offering legitimacy to secession from an independent state in exceptional circumstances is the subject of much debate. Cassese, for example, concludes that a racial or religious group may attempt secession, a form of external self-determination, when it is apparent that internal self-determination is absolutely beyond reach. Extreme and unremitting persecution and the lack of any reasonable prospect for peaceful challenge may make secession legitimate. A racial or religious group may secede -thus exercising the most radical form of external self-determination -once it is clear that all attempts to achieve internal self-determination have failed or are destined to fail.
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This posits a very high threshold and one assumes that some form of external validation of the failure of the efforts to attain internal self-determination would be necessary. Nevertheless, it would appear that practice demonstrating the successful application of even this modest proposition is lacking. Thirdly, it may well be the case that the attitudes adopted by third states and the international community as a whole, most likely expressed through the United Nations, in deciding whether or not to recognize the independence of a seceding entity will be affected by circumstances factually precipitating the secession, so that recognition may be more forthcoming where the secession has occurred as a consequence of violations of human rights. Thus, the content of the clause should perhaps best be seen in this light, that is as a relevant factor in determining the views taken by the international community generally, and states particularly, as to recognition.
In fact, the principle of self-determination as it operates with regard to sovereign, independent states outside the colonial and foreign occupation framework has been reworked to concentrate upon human rights matters within the territory of each state.
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Note that this clause is reaffirmed in the Vienna Declaration and Programme of Action of the World Conference on Human Rights 1993 in section 1(2), although without me qualifying phrase relating to 'race, creed or colour'; see A/49/668 and 32 ILM (1993) 1661. Note also that section 1(7) of the Vienna Declaration emphasizes that 'the processes of promoting and protecting human rights should be conducted in conformity with the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations, and international law'. 24 Supra note 2, at 120. See also Rosenstock, supra note 22, at 713, 732; and R. Mullerson, Human Rights Diplomacy (1997), at 52-3.
As Brownlie has noted, the principle has a core of reasonable certainty and this consists in 'the right of a community which has a distinct character to have this character reflected in the institutions of government under which it lives'. 23 Selfdetermination constitutes a collective assertion or manifestation of a bundle of human rights. In its General Comment on Self-Determination adopted in 1984, 26 the Human Rights Committee, established under the Internationa] Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, emphasized that the realization of the right was 'an essential condition for the effective guarantee and observance of individual human rights '. 27 In the context of the significance of this principle within independent states, the Committee has encouraged states parties to provide details in their reports about participation in social and political structures.
28 So too, in engaging in dialogue with representatives of states parties, questions are regularly posed as to how political institutions operate and how the people of the state concerned participate in the governance of their state. 29 This necessarily links in with consideration of other articles of the Covenant concerning, for example, freedom of expression (Article 19), freedom of assembly (Article 21), freedom of association (Article 22) and the right to take part in the conduct of public affairs and to vote (Article 25). The right of self-determination provides the overall framework for the consideration of the principles relating to democratic governance.
30 Thus, the principle of selfdetermination acts as a legal mechanism to achieve a range of relevant human rights within the territorial framework of independent states, and not as a tool legally justifying the dismantling of such states. Quite which rights might fall within the principle of self-determination is perhaps unsettled, and as the Yugoslav Arbitration Commission noted in Opinion No. 2, 'international law as it currently stands does not spell out all the implications of the right to self-determination'.
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Within the context of the above discussion, self-determination takes effect as the right of peoples. But there is another collective right that may be relevant to the territorial question: that is, the right of minorities or, more correctly, the rights of persons belonging to minorities. 32 The post Hrst Worid War settlement sought to This modest and rather negative provision as formulated centres upon 'persons belonging' to minorities rather than upon minorities as such and does not define the concept of minorities. 34 Nevertheless, the UN Human Rights Committee has taken the opportunity to consider die issue in discussing states' reports, individual petitions and in a General Comment 35 In its General Comment, 36 die Committee emphasized that die rights under Article 27 did not prejudice the sovereignty and territorial integrity of states, although certain minority rights, particularly those relating to indigenous communities, might consist of a way of life closely associated with territory and use of its resources. This approach, treating minority rights within a defined territorial framework and clearly subject to it even if such rights impact upon land or territorial issues, was also adopted by the UN General Assembly Declaration on die Rights of Persons Belonging to National or Ethnic, Religious and Linguistic Minorities in December 1992. 37 that 'nothing in the present Declaration may be construed as permitting any activity contrary to the purposes and principles of the United Nations, including sovereign equality, territorial integrity and political independence of states'.
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However, there may in certain circumstances be a territorial dimension to minority rights. The Copenhagen Declaration of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe 1990 provides in paragraph 33 that the participating states 'note the efforts undertaken to protect and create conditions for the promotion of the ... identity of certain national minorities by establishing, as one of the possible means to achieve these aims, specific local or autonomous administrations corresponding to the specific historical and territorial circumstances of these minorities, in accordance with the policies of the state concerned 1 . 39 Article 10(2) of the Council of Europe's Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities 1995 provides that, 'in areas inhabited by persons belonging to national minorities traditionally or in substantial numbers, if those persons so request and where such a request corresponds to a real need, the parties shall endeavour to ensure, as far as possible, the condition which would make it possible to use the minority language in relations between those persons and the administrative authorities'. Article 11(3) also provides that in areas inhabited by substantial numbers of members of a national minority, the parties shall endeavour, where there is sufficient demand, to display traditional local names, street names and other topographical indications intended for the public also in the minority language. Article 14(2) provides that in such situations, parties should also seek to ensure as far as possible and within the framework of their educational systems that persons belonging to minorities should have adequate opportunities for learning and for learning in their own language. 40 Although extremely cautiously formulated and accompanied by significant provisos, it is possible to conclude that there can be a territorial dimension to relevant minority rights within the territorial framework of independent states.
41 But this will depend in specific instances upon, for example, bilateral action together with domestic legislation. However, those minorities that are accepted as having the clearest territorial manifestation are indigenous peoples. Such peoples are identified and characterized by the particularly close relationship maintained with the territory they inhabit 47 Article 14 of International Labour Organisation Convention No. 169 of 1989, for example, provides that the rights of ownership and possession of the peoples concerned over the lands which they traditionally occupy shall be recognized. 48 The UN SubCommission on the Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of Minorities adopted a Draft Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples in 1994, 49 which emphasizes a range of individual and collective rights, including the right to selfdetermination, freedom from genocide, the right to maintain their cultural traditions, and rights to language, education, establishment of media facilities and participation at all levels of decision-making affecting their interests. In particular, various rights connected with the ownership, control and use of land are proposed. 50 In addition, the Draft provides in Article 31 that 'indigenous peoples, as a specific form of exercising their right to self-determination, have the right to autonomy or selfgovernment in matters relating to their internal and local affairs'. Quite what this means in practice is unclear and it is, of course, by no means certain that this Draft Declaration will be adopted as such by the UN. Even if that were to happen, the normative impact would be minimal in that UN declarations are recommendatory only. Nevertheless, the fact that the notion of some form of autonomy rights has been proposed with regard to indigenous peoples constitutes an interesting step.
The fact remains that however extensive the list of individual and collective rights may turn out to be in international law relative to indigenous peoples, these would only be exercisable within the existing territorial definition of the particular state. One cannot confuse internal territorial rights with territorial sovereignty. This point was emphasized in particular in the 1995 Draft Inter-American Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, 51 which, while laying down a wide range of provisions with regard to such rights, concludes in Article XXTV by stating that 'nothing in this instrument shall be construed as granting any right to ignore boundaries between states'. It cannot, therefore, be maintained that the current conception of minority rights in international law includes the right as such to territorial autonomy. Whatever the rights afforded under international law to individuals, groups, minorities or peoples, The same rule positing die continuance of an international boundary notwithstanding die independence of an entity territorially defined in whole or in part by such boundary applies also where die boundary has become established otherwise 
A. Uti Possidetis and Statehood
The principle of uti possidetis is concerned with the territorial aspect of the move to independence. It is therefore one aspect of the process of creation of statehood. Whether and how a new state emerges is a major issue of fundamental importance to the international community and it is a phenomenon much studied. 67 The two processes are therefore not identical, although connected to the same phenomenon of the establishment of a new international legal person. A new state will come into existence once it is clear that a new entity complying with the criteria of statehood has emerged Article 1 of the Montevideo Convention on Rights and Duties of States 1933 lays down the most widely accepted formulation of the criteria of statehood in international law, noting that the state as an international person should possess a permanent population, a defined territory, government, and capacity to enter into relations with other states. The Yugoslav Arbitration Commission in Opinion No. I 68 declared that 'the existence or disappearance of a state was a question of fact' and that 'the state is commonly defined as a community which consists of a territory and a population subject to an organised political authority*. Conformity with the criteria would, absent special factors, be sufficient to establish statehood and this would be reinforced and evidenced by international recognition.
69 It is also clear that a new state may be created even if there is some uncertainty or dispute over its boundaries. 75 It has also been reaffirmed judicially. 76 In Latin America, the doctrine applied as between the successor states to the Spanish Empire and not as between those states and Brazil, the successor state to the Portuguese Empire on the continent The Brazilian view of uti possidetis was to emphasize that it applied de facto rather than de jure, that is it applied to factual possession rather than to legal lines founded upon legal title.
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From Latin America the doctrine moved to Africa, 78 where the political and historical situation was rather different Whereas essentially one colonial power was involved in Latin America, in Africa some seven European colonial powers were engaged, each with more than one colony at varying times. 79 The mode of establishing boundaries was also different in that geometric lines predominated and, on the whole, there was little reference to local ethnic or economic considerations.
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The process of decolonization proceeded upon the basis of the principle of selfdetermination, with its assertions first that the territory of a colony was separate and distinct from that of the colonial power and, secondly, that the people of each colony had the right to determine its own political status, up to and including independence. 81 With the development of decolonization as a legal principle in the form of self-determination, die question arose as to the appropriate territorial framework. This was early established as that of die colonially defined territory, unless there were special circumstances requiring determinations by units within the colonial territory. Such exceptions were justified either on the basis of consent where die situation was deemed to require this 82 This definition was reaffirmed in the El Salvador/Honduras case 88 and referred to as an authoritative statement In the latter case, the Chamber emphasized that uti possidetis was essentially 'a retrospective principle, investing as international boundaries administrative limits intended originally for quite other purposes'. 89 It was underlined in the Burkina Faso/Mali case 90 that 'the principle of uti possidetis freezes the territorial title; it stops the clock but does not put back the hands'. The law that is applicable to this process is essentially domestic law, 91 although the principle itself is one of international law so that recourse to other matters may become necessary in order to determine, if possible, the uti possidetis line. Such other matters would include, for example, administrative practices, the actual exercise of authority and the conduct of the new states during the period immediately after independence.
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The appropriate time frame is clearly the moment of independence, 93 although in certain situations the matter may be rather more complex, for instance, where the date of independence simply marks the date of succession to boundaries established with binding force by earlier instruments, as in the Libya/Chad case 94 or where more than one party is concerned with different dates of independence. Of course, materials subsequent to independence may prove determinative of title, such as when relevant treaties have been entered into or an adjudicative award has taken place.
It is important to recognize uti possidetis for what it is, and not to overemphasize it It is a transitional mechanism and process which concerns the transmission of sovereignty from a previous sovereign authority to the new state. It is, therefore, part of the larger principle relating to the stability of territorial relationships.
95 It provides the territorial delineation for the process of establishment of a new state by positing, absent special factors, the continuation of the pre-existing line, whatever provenance that line previously claimed. It is limited both temporally and conceptually to this situation. Once the new state is estabhshed, the principle of uti possidetis will give way to the principle of territorial integrity, which provides for the international protection of the new state so created. While it 'freezes' the territorial situation during the movement to independence, uti possidetis does not prescribe a territorial boundary which can never be changed. It is not intangible in this sense.
If the principle of uti possidetis has now been clearly recognized as a rule of international law applicable generally with regard to the phenomenon of decoloniza- 
C. Uti Possidetis as a General Principle
This acceptance of uti possidetis as a principle of general applicability going beyond the purely decolonization scenario has, however, been challenged. 99 Two arguments have been presented: first, that it is in law not correct, and secondly, that it would offend other principles of international law, particularly the right to self-determination and human rights generally.
The First Challenge
The first objection focuses upon the alleged extension by the Arbitration Commission of an ambiguous obiter dicta by the Chamber in the Burkina Faso/Mali case. The Chamber, of course, discussed the principle of uti possidetis within the context of the compromis which specifically referred to the principle of the intangibility of colonial frontiers. 100 But it is striking that the Chamber felt it important to deal with the principle. 101 The Chamber sought to trace the origin of uti possidetis in Spanish America and to underline that the principle was not 'a special rule which pertains solely to one specific system of international law'. 102 On the contrary. 
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it is a general principle, which is logically connected with the phenomenon of the obtaining of independence, wherever it occurs. Its obvious purpose is to prevent the independence and stability of new states being endangered by fratricidal straggles provoked by the challenging of frontiers following the withdrawal of the administering power.
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The Chamber was, of course, dealing with uti possidetis in that case in the context of the decolonization process. However, the way in which it phrased its comment does suggest something more than a statement that uti possidetis applies in all situations of decolonization. It does seem that the Chamber was keen to make a general statement as to the situation with regard to 'the obtaining of independence, wherever it occurs'. The fact that the expressed justification for the principle -that is, the prevention of 'fratricidal struggles provoked by the challenging of frontiers' -is eminently applicable beyond the decolonization situation reinforces the perception that a generalized comment was being made. There was no need for the Chamber to do other than note that uti possidetis was applicable as between the parties as a result of its inclusion in the compronds. However, the Chamber moved beyond this. Clearly, the Chamber was underlining the fact that uti possidetis applied to all decolonization situations. But the way in which it worded this does give rise to the legitimate interpretation that in the Chamber's view the principle applied in all situations where there was a movement from one sovereign authority to another. Such statements by the Court outside the strict ratio decidendi of a decision can constitute authoritative statements of the law. They may reflect existing customary law or may form part of the process leading to the creation of a new norm of customary law. In the latter case, one needs to take into account the extent to which the statement in question is consistent or inconsistent with pre-existing international law. It is indisputable that a new norm of customary law would require a lower level of evidential support where there is in existence no prior contradictory norm than would be the case where it is sought to overturn or seriously modify an existing norm. 104 Since there was in existence no norm of customary law expressly precluding the application of the uti possidetis principle to new states emerging from existing states, it is argued that the level of proof required to establish that the principle does now extend to such situations is not particularly high. Indeed, the logic of the basic justification for the existence of the principle, that is the avoidance of conflict upon a succession of sovereign authorities in the territorial context, applies equally to the post-colonial scenario. 
The Yugoslav Arbitration Commission built upon this approach of the

erred by its 'misinterpretation'
106 or 'misrepresentations' 107 of the Chamber's reasoning or judgment This is based on the conclusion that the Chamber was referring only to the process of independence upon decolonization. In support of this position, elements from paragraph 23 of the judgment are cited. 108 A deeper look at this paragraph is therefore required The paragraph commences with the meaning of uti possidetis in Spanish America and the reason for its existence, the first being the avoidance of renewed colonization by extra-continental powers. However, the Chamber went on to state that 'there is more to the principle of uti possidetis than this particular aspect'. Switching to a more abstract approach, the Chamber underlined that 'the essence of the principle lies in its primary aim of securing respect for the territorial boundaries at the moment when independence is achieved'. One should note in particular the generality of the sentence and the use of the present tense. The Chamber continued by stating that 'such territorial boundaries might be no more than delimitations between different administrative divisions or colonies all subject to the same sovereign. In that case, the application of the principle of uti possidetis resulted in administrative boundaries being transformed into international frontiers in the full sense of the term*. Having made these broad statements, the Chamber then referred specifically to the states of the former Spanish America and to the parties in the instant case emerging from French West Africa and concluded in this context that 'uti possidetis, as a principle which upgraded former administrative delimitations, established during the colonial period, to international frontiers, is therefore a principle of a general kind which is logically connected with this form of decolonization wherever it occurs'. This approach to the Chamber's judgment notes the mixing of the general and the particular. The Chamber was inevitably bound to focus upon the particular facts of the case which found their source in the process of decolonization. Nevertheless, it does seem upon careful reading that the Chamber was seeking to underline that behind the application of uti possidetis to all decolonization situations lay a more general principle which relates to all independence processes. This is perhaps reinforced by looking at paragraph 20 of the judgment, 109 where the Chamber emphasizes that the principle of uti possidetis 'is a general principle, which is logically connected with the phenomenon of die obtaining of independence, wherever it occurs*. Chamber's statement to conclude that uti possidetis was an abstract principle applicable to all independence situations. It is, indeed, quite a normal judicial process to move step by step from examining a set of facts, to inferring from them a legal principle expressed in generalizable form, to applying that principle to a set of facts deemed analogous to, but not identical with, the original scenario. It is also true that the weight of state practice in recent years clearly supports the view that the principle of uti possidetis applies presumptively to post-colonial independence situations.
Article 5 sidetis. Where there was opposition to such a process, international practice similarly, and more importantly, supports the principle that the territorial framework of the transition to independence was that of the former unit within accepted administrative borders. The reaffirmation by international bodies of the territorial integrity of the states in question also marked acceptance of uti possidetis, since the principle of territorial integrity operates after independence and in order to safeguard the territorial framework of independence (i.e., uti possidetis).
The Second Challenge
The second objection to the entrenchment of uti possidetis as a general principle of international law relates to the interaction between that principle and the right to self-determination. It has been argued that as a result of the rise of this right, the traditional law relating to territorial sovereignty has been modified. 121 The contention, however, has demonstrated a crucial shift across categories since the argument moves imperceptibly from internal self-determination questions to matters of external territorial sovereignty. While the principle of self-determination as it operates within independent states reflects and enhances a bundle of individual and collectively manifested rights, it is abundantly clear that this has no impact upon the distinct question of territorial sovereignty. Even the 'hard' minority rights relating to autonomy, where they exist, do not extend to challenging or changing the territorial title of the state in question. The furthest along this particular line are the indigenous peoples, but nowhere has it been suggested that the territorial rights that they may possess affect in any way the territorial definition of the state in which they live. Such rights do not include the right in international law to secession. Of course, if any particular group attempts secession and succeeds, then the question of territorial integrity and statehood will be regulated by effectiveness coupled with international reaction. But that is a different question. Self-determination cannot affect international borders as such.
Nevertheless, the argument has been put that where an existing state breaks up, either by way of secession or through complete dismemberment, the succeeding units may be territorially defined in a way that reflects human rights considerations. 122 One example of this may be to safeguard peoples who would be in a minority in the new state and, fearful of their future, would thus wish to remain in the former state where that continues. This may be termed the Canada syndrome. Another example would be where members of the ethnic majority in one successor state are located within the borders of another, hostile one. This would be the Serb syndrome, operating within Croatia and Bosnia as defined via uti possidetis. In both cases, fears of human rights violations fuel sovereignty assertions. The question is how international law may best deal with such situations. The territorial solution (uti possidetis) provides that presumptively the borders of the new state are those of the administrative unit that preceded it and that matters of self-determination and human rights must be dealt with within that new territorial framework. The enlarged self-determination thesis, which opposes the application of uti possidetis, argues that the new boundaries must as of right reflect in some way the views of the people concerned.
123 Of course, the new entities (plus the continuing state where there is one) may deal with this matter by a consensual re-arrangement of the former administrative borders. This is fully consistent with bom international law in general and uti possidetis in particular. However, where no such consensual re-arrangement is possible for whatever reason, not to operate on the basis of uti possidetis is likely to cause immense problems. Any attempted ethnic reconfiguration of die Former Yugoslavia on a totally free-for-all basis, without the presumptive uti possidetis rule with regard to boundaries, would most likely have produced an even worse situation than that which did occur. In addition to die deeply destabilizing effects that such an approach would have internally, in terms of the international situation it would remove substantial restraints from states contemplating intervention when faced with a civil war involving edinic kin in a neighbouring state.
The absence of a uti possidetis presumption would leave in place as the guiding principle only effective control or self-determination. To rely on effective control as the principal criterion for die creation of international boundaries would be to invite die use of force as die inexorable first step. It would be wholly counter to all notions of order, human rights and stability. Self-determination is a principle whose definition in this extended version is wholly unpredictable. Precisely which groups would be entitled in such situations to claim a share of die territory? The possibilities range from large indigenous groups and ethnic, religious and language groups to cultural or political groups. How would one tackle in such circumstances die possible claims of groups within groups, such as, for the sake of argument, religious groups within language groups in Canada? Or possibly, competing non-French language groups in Quebec, or possibly political groups within religious groups in Bosnia? If each group or set of individuals was able to make claims in this area, questions would arise as to how to rank such claims as between such groups. Would, for example, indigenous peoples and English-speaking minorities in Quebec rank equally? Indeed, die difficulties would become almost insurmountable where different edinic groups were deeply intermingled. One might also have to find a way, it would seem, to factor in economic considerations, for example where die resources of an area inhabited by a particular group who wished to secede from me seceding entity were crucial to die future viability of die latter. Further, the issue would arise as to who would have the authority to make die final determinations. Or would the matter be left to considerations of pure or brute power? Bearing in mind mat secessions and dissolutions invariably take place in periods of stress and that the absence of a consensual arrangement which would be the precursor to such a situation would also heighten tension, it appears that a peaceful and ordered resolution of territorial issues might be rather unlikely. The example of the partition of British India, especially the division of the provinces of Punjab and Bengal between India and Pakistan upon a religious basis, is particularly instructive. Even those opposed to the principle of uti possidetis as generally applicable note that it is the preferable short-term approach for determining borders in troubled circumstances. 124 The argument of such writers tends to focus upon longer-term factors. However, if one accepts the shortterm applicability of uti possidetis, it must be accepted that the risks of adopting a less preferable strategy may not indeed lead to greater legitimacy and justice but rather to greater instability and bloodshed.
V. Uti Possidetis and Self-Determination -Conclusions
The primary justification of the principle of uti possidetis, first in Latin America and then in Africa, has been to seek to minimize threats to peace and security, whether they be internal, regional or international. This is achieved by entrenching territorial stability at the critical moment of the transition to independence. Precisely the same impulse lies behind the recognition of the principle outside the purely colonial context where the same dangers resulting from the break-up of existing states are evident There is little to suggest that the hazards resulting from the creation of new states out of parts or all of existing states and the perils of widespread disruption and ethnic violence are restricted to the traditional colonial situation or to the continents of Latin America and Africa. The same broad reasons impelling the establishment of the principle of uti possidetis as a specific regional norm led to its establishment as a general principle in international law.
The legal basis of the doctrine is well established, its extent has recently been controverted. That uti possidetis governs colonial situations is evident, that it extends to all cases of transition to independence has, it is believed, become clear. This is based upon statements in the Burkina Faso/Mali case, which are legitimately generalizable and the explicit views of the Yugoslav Arbitration Commission. Neither of these assertions were per se legally determinative: the Chamber's comments were in strict terms obiter dicta, while the opinions of the Arbitration Commission need to be seen within the context of the fact that the Commission itself was constitutionally advisory only. Nevertheless, both sets of statements are authoritative, particularly bearing in mind that there was no prior rule of international law precluding the application of the uti possidetis principle to post-colonial situations. In addition, subsequent practice has been fully in conformity with the principle, while contradictory claims have met with international opposition. There would appear to 
